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This seventh surveillance report provides an assessment of Spain's economic and financial situation 
following its exit from the financial assistance programme in January 2014. A team from the 
European Commission (EC), in liaison with staff from the European Central Bank (ECB), carried out the 
seventh post-programme surveillance visit to Spain on 24-26 April 2017. The European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) participated in the meetings on aspects relating to its own Early Warning System. The 
report focuses on macroeconomic and financial sector developments, complementing the surveillance by 
the Commission under the macroeconomic imbalances procedure, the Stability and Growth Pact and, 
more broadly, the European Semester of economic policy coordination.   
After exceeding expectations in 2016, Spain's real GDP growth is expected to remain robust this 
year and the next. In 2016, economic activity expanded strongly, by 3.2%, the same rate as in the 
previous year and well above the euro area average. Domestic demand, and especially private 
consumption, remained the main driver of growth, but net exports also contributed. Growth was 
underpinned by favourable external and financing conditions and strong job creation, in turn supported by 
continued wage moderation and past reforms. Real GDP growth was again stronger than expected in the 
first quarter of this year and, according to the Commission 2017 spring forecast, is expected to remain 
robust in 2017 as a whole and in 2018, despite some moderation.    
The financial sector is benefitting from the strong economic recovery. At the aggregate level, the 
banking system comfortably meets the regulatory capital requirements and the quality of banks' assets has 
further strengthened, with the non-performing loan ratio continuing its downward trend. Ample access to 
liquidity and low funding costs facilitated new bank lending, in particular to households and SMEs. This 
in turn supported economic activity. Overall, the Spanish banks continued to be profitable in 2016. 
However, as for other European banks, their profitability was squeezed by the low interest rate 
environment, subdued lending activity and ongoing provisioning efforts, also to cover for the European 
Court of Justice ruling from December 2016 on the Spanish mortgage floor clauses. Against this 
background, and in light of the challenges posed by the EU-wide bank restructuring and regulatory 
changes, the Spanish credit institutions need to adapt further their business models. In addition, despite 
being on a declining trend, NPLs are still higher than the EU median and represent a burden. Some 
smaller banks need to continue reinforcing their balance sheets. 
On 7 June 2017, Banco Popular was resolved following difficulties linked to a significant portfolio 
of legacy real estate assets and rapidly deteriorating liquidity. The resolution scheme was the first 
adopted by the Single Resolution Board under EU bank recovery and resolution rules. It entailed the sale 
of Banco Popular to Banco Santander in order to ensure the continuity of the important functions 
performed by the bank, including full access by customers to deposits, and to avoid adverse effects on 
financial stability. 
The implementation of the restructuring plans of the Spanish banks that have received state aid is 
well advanced and should be completed by the end of the year. The FROB(1) has given the green light 
for the merger of state-owned Bankia and Banco Mare Nostrum, following a two-year extension for 
completing its divestment from the two banks, in order to maximise value for taxpayers. Continued 
restructuring of these banks, also after the merger, will strengthen the stability of the banking sector. A 
Royal Decree recently adopted by the government delays the full implementation of the original reform of 
the savings bank sector.  
Advancing the divestment of its portfolio in a profitable manner represents a challenge for the asset 
management company SAREB. SAREB (2) has clearly been instrumental in the restructuring of the 
banking sector and in 2016, it continued divesting its portfolio. However, it still posted negative results 
                                                          
(1) FROB stands for Spanish Executive Resolution Authority, http://www.frob.es  
(2) Sociedad de Gestión de Activos Procedentes de la Reestructuración Bancaria S.A. (SAREB) 
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last year. The ongoing recovery of the Spanish real estate market should help to improve SAREB's 
financial situation, but further sustained efforts are needed to optimise its operations and financial results.  
Robust growth continues supporting the rebalancing of the economy, but the overall indebtedness 
of the country remains high. Private sector debt reduction has progressed at a fast pace, converging to 
the euro area average. However, deleveraging needs are still present in some parts of the economy and the 
still high level of private and public debt is reflected in a sizeable amount of external liabilities, which 
expose the country to shifts in market sentiment. Furthermore, low productivity growth, in particular total 
factor productivity growth, makes competitiveness gains hinge upon cost advantages. The decrease of 
unemployment has been remarkable over the past two years, but at 18.8% of the labour force in the first 
quarter of 2017, it remains among the highest in the EU and mainly affects youth and low-skilled 
workers. In addition, more than half of the unemployed have been without a job for more than one year. 
At the same time, only about half of the increase in employment in the last year is attributable to 
permanent contracts, and about a quarter of all workers had a temporary contract in the first quarter of 
2017, and this rate has not decreased during the last year.  
The public debt ratio is set to decrease only mildly until 2018. According to the Commission 2017 
spring forecast, gross general government debt is set to decrease from 99.5% of GDP in 2016 to 98.5% of 
GDP in 2018, mainly thanks to strong nominal GDP growth. Spain is currently under the corrective arm 
of the Stability and Growth Pact, with deadline for correction of the excessive deficit at 2018. In 2016, the 
headline deficit reached 4.5% of GDP in 2016, below the 4.6% target set by the Council. The 
Commission 2017 spring forecast projects the headline deficit to decline further but remain above the 
targets set by the Council for 2017 and 2018, by 0.1% and 0.4% of GDP, respectively. The required fiscal 
effort over 2016-2017 is expected to be narrowly ensured, while in 2018, on a no-policy-change basis, the 
fiscal effort is forecast to fall short of what was requested by the Council. Against this background, on 22 
May 2017 the Commission recommended the Council to recommend Spain to ensure compliance with the 
Council decision of 8 August 2016 giving notice under the excessive deficit procedure, including also 
measures to strengthen the fiscal and public procurement frameworks.(3)    
Ensuring a balanced, durable and inclusive growth path over the long term remains a challenge. 
While robust growth continues to support the rebalancing of the Spanish economy and the stabilisation of 
the financial sector, continued efforts are needed to sustain the resilience of the banking sector. The 
consolidation effort to ensure a durable reduction of the general government deficit and debt, in line with 
the fiscal adjustment path set by the Council, needs to continue. Importantly, the structural reform agenda 
needs to be resumed, avoiding any backtracking on past reforms, with a view to furthering the 
rebalancing of the economy, bringing the unemployed back to work and raising Spain's productivity and 
growth potential.   
On the basis of the analysis in the report, repayment risks for the ESM loan appear very low. Since 
July 2014, Spain has made five voluntary early repayments. The next post-programme surveillance 
mission will take place in autumn 2017. 
                                                          
(3) https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2017-european-semester-country-specific-recommendations-commission-
recommendations_-_spain_0.pdf 
1. INTRODUCTION 
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1. Spain successfully exited the financial 
assistance programme for the recapitalisation 
of financial institutions in January 2014. The 
Programme had been agreed by the Eurogroup on 
9 July 2012 for a period of 18 months(4) and 
provided financing by the euro area Member States 
of up to EUR 100 billion. Eventually, Spain used 
EUR 38.8 billion for bank recapitalisation, under 
restructuring and resolution plans approved by the 
European Commission under State-aid rules, and 
around EUR 2.2 billion for capitalising SAREB, 
the Spanish asset management company. Both the 
bank-specific conditionality and the horizontal 
conditionality included in the Memorandum of 
Understanding were fulfilled as scheduled.(5) 
Since July 2014, Spain has made five voluntary 
early repayments,  following which the 
outstanding amount of the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) loan stands at 
EUR 33.7 billion. Spain also announced the 
intention to make another early repayment in 
November 2017. 
2. Staff from the European Commission, in 
liaison with the European Central Bank, 
undertook the seventh post-programme review 
mission to Spain from 24 to 26 April 2017. The 
ESM participated in the meetings on aspects 
related to its own Early Warning System. Post-
programme surveillance (PPS) aims at a broad 
monitoring of the repayment capacity of a country 
having received financial assistance.(6) There is no 
policy conditionality under PPS, although the 
Council can issue recommendations for corrective 
actions if deemed necessary and appropriate. PPS 
is biannual in terms of reporting and missions. The 
previous PPS mission took place in October 
2016.(7) 
                                                          
(4) However, the completion of the restructuring of the banks 
receiving public support under the State aid rules was due 
to take place after the exit from the programme.  
(5) For more details see the report: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/economy-
finance/evaluation-financial-sector-assistance-programme-
spain-2012-2014_en. 
(6) PPS is foreseen by Art. 14 of the two-pack 
Regulation (EU) N°472/2013. It starts automatically after 
the expiry of the programme and lasts at least until 75% of 
the financial assistance has been repaid. 
(7) For more details see the sixth PPS report:   
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/economy-
 
3. On 7 June, the European Commission 
endorsed, under EU banking recovery and 
resolution rules, the resolution scheme of Banco 
Popular Español, S.A. In the context of months of 
market pressure after recording sizeable losses in 
2016, and having confirmed a stressed liquidity 
situation, the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM) assessed Banco Popular as "failing or likely 
to fail", therefore triggering resolution. The 
resolution scheme, adopted by the Single 
Resolution Board, involved the sale of the bank to 
Spain's biggest banking group, Santander, and full 
protection of depositors while ensuring financial 
stability and avoiding the use of public funds 
4. The spring 2017 PPS cycle focuses on the 
Spanish financial sector, complementing the 
surveillance under the macroeconomic 
imbalances procedure, the Stability and 
Growth Pact and more broadly the European 
Semester of economic policy coordination. This 
PPS report complements the 2017 country report 
for Spain(8), published on 22 February 2017 in the 
context of the European Semester. That report 
includes an In-Depth Review on the prevention 
and correction of macroeconomic imbalances 
under Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 
1176/2011.  The Commission’s analysis in the 
report led it to conclude that Spain is experiencing 
macroeconomic imbalances which have cross-
border relevance(9) Spain is also subject to 
surveillance under the corrective arm of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. In particular, on 8 
August 2016, the Council requested Spain to put 
an end to the excessive deficit situation by 2018. 
On 22 May 2017, the European Commission 
presented its 2017 country-specific 
recommendations (CSRs), setting out its economic 
policy guidance for individual Member States for 
the next 12 to 18 months. The Commission 
proposed the Council to recommend Spain(10) to 
pursue structural reforms in the areas of the labour 
                                                                                   
finance/post-programme-surveillance-report-spain-autumn-
2016_en 
(8) https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2017-european-
semester-country-report-spain-en.pdf. 
(9) https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2017-european-
semester-country-reports-comm-en.pdf .  
(10) https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2017-european-
semester-country-specific-recommendations-commission-
recommendations_-_spain-es.pdf. 
European Commission 
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market, social policy, education, and business 
regulation. It further called on Spain to promote 
investment in research and innovation and ensure 
compliance with the Council decision of 8 August 
2016 giving notice under the excessive deficit 
procedure.   
2. RECENT MACROECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SECTOR 
DEVELOPMENTS 
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2.1. RECENT MACROECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENTS 
5. Economic growth continued exceeding 
expectations in 2016. On its fourth year of 
expansion, real GDP increased by 3.2%, the same 
rate as in the previous year and well above the euro 
area average. Real GDP growth in the first quarter 
of 2017 was again robust, at 0.8% q-o-q. The 
strength of the recovery partly reflects the impact 
of the structural reforms implemented in recent 
years, in particular the labour market reform that 
supported cost-competitiveness gains. The 
expansion is underpinned by a more balanced 
growth pattern than before the crisis. Domestic 
demand, and, specifically, private consumption, 
was the main driver of growth, but net exports also 
contributed.    
6. The Commission 2017 spring forecast 
expects economic growth to ease over the 
forecast horizon but to remain robust. Real 
GDP growth is expected to moderate to 2.8% in 
2017 and 2.4% in 2018 (see Graph 2.1). (11) 
Private consumption is expected to slow down as 
job creation decelerates and the tailwinds that 
supported growth of disposable income in recent 
years - i.e. declining oil prices, tax cuts and 
improving financial conditions - gradually abate. 
However, private consumption is still projected to 
remain the main contributor to growth over the 
forecast horizon. After decelerating in 2016, 
investment is expected to rebound modestly in 
2017 and 2018, as the gradual recovery in 
residential construction investment more than 
offsets the projected moderation in equipment 
investment growth, in line with final demand.  
7. The external sector is expected to 
contribute to growth over the forecast horizon. 
In 2016, the growth of both exports and imports 
decelerated. However, the contribution of the 
external sector to growth turned positive in 2016, 
as exports continued to gain sizeable market shares 
                                                          
(11) The Commission 2017 spring forecast does not incorporate 
the INE estimate for real GDP growth in the first quarter of 
2017, as it was first released after the cut-off date of the 
forecast. 
and outpaced import growth. Export growth is 
expected to accelerate in 2017, as Spain's main 
trading partners recover, before slowing down in 
2018, as cost-competitiveness gains become more 
muted. Import growth is also forecast to pick up in 
2017, before decelerating again in 2018 in line 
with slowing final demand. However, as growth of 
imports is expected to lag behind that of exports, 
net exports are set to give a positive, though 
declining, contribution to growth throughout the 
forecast horizon. After improving in 2016 (to 2% 
of GDP), the current account surplus is forecast to 
decrease in 2017 and stabilise in 2018, mostly due 
the impact of the expected worsening in terms of 
trade. In cyclically adjusted terms, the Spanish 
current account turned positive in 2016 for the first 
time in decades, signalling a structural 
improvement in trade performance. Cost-
competitiveness gains that supported the increase 
in the number of regular exporters and early signs 
of import substitution underpin this improvement. 
Net external lending is expected to remain 
relatively stable at around 2% of GDP over the 
forecast horizon. 
Graph 2.1: Composition of GDP growth 
 
GFCF: gross fixed capital formation 
Source: INE, European Economic Forecast, spring 2017 
8. Short-term inflation dynamics continue to 
be dominated by changes in oil and energy 
prices, whereas wage developments will shape 
price dynamic in the medium term. Headline 
inflation (measured by the HICP) is expected to 
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turn positive, rising from -0.3% on average in 2016 
to 2% in 2017. It would decrease to 1.4% in 2018, 
as the base effects of energy price increases fade 
away in the second half of 2017. Core inflation is 
expected to increase modestly over the forecast 
horizon, as wages gradually pick-up and the 
cyclical slack of the economy declines. 
9. The housing market consolidates its 
recovery. After the sharp adjustment that followed 
the crisis, the housing market and the construction 
sector have recovered. Unsubsidised housing 
prices increased by 4.5% year-on-year in the fourth 
quarter of 2016. (12) Prices of new dwellings went 
up by 4.3% in the last quarter of 2016 and those of 
used dwellings by 4.5%. Moreover, in 2016 the 
number of transactions on dwellings increased by 
13.7% year-on-year, according to INE. Despite 
these positive signs, there is still a large stock of 
unsold houses.  
10. Job creation is expected to remain strong 
but decelerate over the forecast horizon. In 2016 
employment increased by a strong 2.9% in full-
time equivalent terms, although at a decelerating 
pace over the year. Employment growth reached 
2.5% year-on-year in the first quarter 2017. This 
moderation is expected to continue gradually 
throughout 2017 and 2018, but full time equivalent 
employment is expected to grow by a still robust 
2.3% and 2.1%, respectively. Accordingly, the 
unemployment rate, which amounted to 18.8% of 
the labour force in the first quarter of 2017, is 
expected to fall below 16% by 2018, still well 
above the pre-crisis level. Modest wage growth 
combined with low productivity gains is set to lead 
to moderate increases in nominal unit labour costs. 
Cost-competitiveness gains vis-à-vis the euro area 
are expected to continue, though slowing down. 
11. Largely thanks to continued strong 
economic growth, Spain’s general government 
deficit narrowed from 5.1% of GDP in 2015 to 
4.5% of GDP in 2016. The Commission 2017 
spring forecast projects the deficit to decline to 
3.2% of GDP in 2017 and, on a no-policy change 
basis, to reach 2.6% of GDP in 2018. The 
reduction of the deficit continues to rely to a large 
extent on the positive macroeconomic outlook, 
                                                          
(12) Source: INE. Other data sources might present different 
results, but also a price recovery. 
which is expected to continue supporting tax 
revenues and keeping social transfers in check. In 
addition, improved financing conditions and a 
slightly decreasing public debt ratio imply that 
interest expenditure is likely to continue to fall. 
Some measures on corporate income taxation as 
well as expenditure control measures have also 
contributed to the deficit reduction in 2016 and 
will contribute further in 2017.  
12. The public debt ratio is set to decrease 
mildly. According to the Commission 2017 spring 
forecast, gross general government debt will 
decrease from 99.4% in 2016 to 98.5% of GDP in 
2018, as strong nominal GDP growth more than 
offsets the impact of the negative budget balance 
and debt-increasing stock-flow adjustments in both 
2017 and 2018. 
Graph 2.2: Indebtedness by sector 
 
NPISH: Non-profit institutions serving households 
Source: BdE, own calculations. 
13. The household and corporate sectors 
continue reducing their debt overhang. The total 
stock of debt of the private sector amounted to 
163.3% of GDP in non-consolidated terms at the 
end of 2016 (64.4% of GDP by households and 
99% of GDP by non-financial corporations; see 
Graph 2.2). This is about 53% of GDP lower than 
at its peak in the second quarter of 2010. (13) 
                                                          
(13) In consolidated terms, the NFC debt decreased from 
117.7% in 2010 Q2 to 83% in 2016 Q4. Financial 
derivatives are excluded from these figures. 
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Although the largest share of the debt reduction is 
attributable to non-financial corporations (a 
reduction of 33% of GDP), progress in households' 
deleveraging was also quite remarkable. The 
progressive amortisation of the credit stock and, 
more recently, robust economic growth have been 
the main drivers of private sector deleveraging, 
while aggregate bank lending has been on a 
declining path since 2011. Behind this aggregate 
picture there are clear sectoral and company 
differences. Deleveraging is continuing especially 
in the construction and real estate sectors, while 
the financial sector is channelling funds to 
healthier and more productive corporations. 
Despite its reduction towards the average for the 
euro area, the outstanding stock of private debt is 
still high in Spain, especially for households. 
Graph 2.3: NIIP by financial instruments 
 
Source: BdE, own calculations. 
14. The still high overall level of debt is 
reflected in a large, though declining, amount of 
net external liabilities. Spain's net international 
investment position (NIIP) improved in 2016, by 
5.7 pps, to -85.7% of GDP. Despite this correction, 
the net debtor position of Spain remains high. Over 
two thirds of the total liabilities – or 167.5% of 
GDP - is represented by callable liabilities 
instruments (see Graph 2.3). Although much of the 
debt has long-term maturity and does not pose an 
immediate risk in terms of liquidity,(14) it 
represents a vulnerability for the economy in case 
of shifts in market sentiment. Against this 
background, it will be crucial for Spain to continue 
recording current account surpluses over a 
sustained period of time in order to decisively 
bring down the still large negative NIIP.    
2.2. FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS 
15. Despite several episodes of volatility on the 
international markets, Spain's financial sector 
indicators remained resilient to external 
developments. After a bank share slump in early 
2016 and following the results of the UK 
referendum in June and of the US elections in 
November, the share prices of most Spanish banks 
bounced back and almost returned to their end-
2015 levels. At the same time, the Spanish 
government bond yields and spreads have 
moderately increased. In May 2017, the Spanish 
10-year government bond yield fluctuated in the 
1.6-1.8% range, and its spread over the German 
Bund was at about 140 basis points, around 
20 points higher than in November 2016 (see 
Graph 2.4). Although the 5-year Spanish CDS 
spreads spiked by around 30 basis points 
immediately after the UK referendum, they 
declined afterwards and stabilised at around 60 
points through the second part of 2016 and around 
40 points in the first quarter of 2017. They 
decreased by an additional 10 points in May 2017.  
                                                          
(14) In addition, Banco de España external debt (net Target-2 
liabilities) that is not subject to refinancing risk amounted 
to 34.8% of GDP in 2016.   
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Graph 2.4: Euro area sovereign spreads to the 10-year 
German bund 
 
Source: IHS Markit, own calculations. 
16. While access to ECB liquidity remains 
ample, Spanish banks are diversifying their 
funding sources. Private bank deposits continued 
to grow, except for deposits stemming from non-
monetary financial institutions, which declined 
somewhat. This eased further the banks' reliance 
on wholesale funding in the context of the overall 
deleveraging of balance sheets and ample access to 
ECB liquidity. Total deposits of households 
increased by almost 2% y-o-y as of February 2017. 
Deposits of non-financial corporations (NFCs) 
accelerated their annual growth rate to 7.8% in 
parallel with the diminishing demand for large 
corporate loans (see Graph 2.5. While the 
importance of wholesale and inter-bank funding 
continued to decline relative to deposits, their 
accessibility and costs improved further. 
Moreover, the Spanish banks' total net borrowing 
from the Eurosystem decreased from its peak of 
EUR 389 billion in August 2012 to around 
EUR 142 billion in January 2017.  
Graph 2.5: Bank deposits 
 
Source: BDE. 
17. Spanish banks continued to deleverage 
their balance sheets but new lending to SMEs 
and households is growing. In March 2017, banks 
reduced their domestic assets further, by about 4% 
y-o-y, in line with the decline of the stock of 
domestic private credit. The stock of credit to 
households shrank by about 1.5% y-o-y at end-
2016 – with the stock of consumer loans 
accelerating to almost 14% y-o-y in February 2017 
and the stock of mortgage loans slowing down its 
pace of decline to about 3% y-o-y, backed by the 
recovery in the housing market. Credit to NFCs 
was still declining by 4.7% y-o-y in February 2017 
(see Graph 2.6). However, including external 
borrowing and issuance of bonds, lending to NFCs 
increased by 0.8% y-o-y as of February 2017. (15) 
Moreover, credit to NFCs was almost flat over the 
last year if the construction and real estate sectors 
are excluded. New lending to households 
continued to rise in 2016 over 2015, but 
decelerated to single-digit growth rates after the 
surge in new lending that occurred in 2015. New 
lending to SMEs (proxied by loans under 
EUR 1 million) advanced by about 3% in 2016 vs. 
2015. It thereby reached a monthly average of 
around EUR 14 billion (a value last observed in 
2011). At the same time, the volume of new 
                                                          
(15) According to the last Banco de España figures, when the 
write-off of bank loans is taken into account, the y-o-y 
growth rate of the stock of bank credit of NFC turned 
positive in March.  
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/e0806e.pdf 
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lending of loans over EUR 1 million declined by 
about one third in 2016 over 2015. This reflects an 
increased capacity of large enterprises to generate 
internal financing and improved access to capital 
markets. Since the launch of the ECB's corporate 
bond purchase programme (CSPP), large 
companies have increased the issuance of euro-
denominated securities and have reduced their 
demand of bank lending. As a result, the volume of 
total new lending to large NFCs retreated in favour 
of new lending to SMEs. 
Graph 2.6: Bank loans to the private sector 
 
The decrease in the stock of loans in late 2012 and early 
2013 was due to the transfer of assets to SAREB. 
Source: BdE, own calculations. 
18. In the first quarter of 2017, credit 
standards for approving NFC's loans became 
stricter while they improved in the case of 
households. According to the BdE's Bank Lending 
Survey (16) from April 2017, margins on loans for 
companies remained unchanged on average but 
they were widened for riskier loans in the first 
quarter of 2017. Margins on mortgage loans were 
broadly narrowed, with the exception of riskier 
loans for which they were widened. In the first 
quarter of 2017, the upswing in credit demand 
materialised. Credit standards for approving NFCs' 
loans were tightened in the first quarter of 2017 
compared to the last quarter of 2016. They were 
further eased for households' consumer credit and 
                                                          
(16) See the report at:  
http://www.bde.es/webbde/en/estadis/infoest/epb.html 
remained unchanged for households' mortgage 
loans.  
19. Access to finance and availability of bank 
credit is not considered an important problem 
by SMEs in Spain and in the euro area 
anymore. In the latest round of the SAFE 
survey (17) (October 2016-March 2017), the share 
of respondents in the euro area considering access 
to finance their most pressing problem further 
declined to only 8.9% from a maximum of 32% in 
the second half of 2009. Access to finance 
represented the least important problem for the 
surveyed Spanish SMEs, with a percentage of 
9.3% - close to the euro area average. Euro area 
SMEs reported a continued increase in the 
availability of bank financing and in the 
willingness of banks to provide credit at lower 
interest rates. The share of Spanish SMEs 
signalling an increase in the availability of bank 
loans went up from 26% to 28% from the previous 
six month period, and remained much higher than 
in European peers. In parallel, the average interest 
rate for new loans to NFCs of up to EUR 1 million 
(a proxy for SME finance) dropped from end-2015 
to March 2017 by 63 bps, to 2.36%. Thus, for the 
first time since 2009, it fell below the interest rate 
charged for similar loans in Germany (2.43 % in 
March 2017). 
                                                          
(17) Survey on the access to finance of small and medium-sized 
enterprise in the Euro Area at:  
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/sme/html/i
ndex.en.html 
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Graph 2.7: Cost of borrowing for NFCs 
 
Source: ECB 
20. On aggregate, Spanish banks continued to 
reduce their NPLs in the second half of 2016 
and the first quarter of 2017. Following the 
continued work-out of such loans by banks, against 
positive economic growth over the past year, the 
stock of NPLs fell by approximately 
EUR 17 billion y-o-y until March 2017, 
corresponding to a 13% reduction of the stock. 
This was due both to disposals and write-offs, as 
well as to cured loans. Meanwhile, the total loan 
volume to NFCs and households decreased by 
about EUR 27 billion over the same period. As a 
result, the share of NPLs in total loans (NPL ratio) 
dropped from 10% in March 2016 to 8.8% one 
year later (see Graph 2.8). This positive trend in 
asset quality was driven by loans to NFCs, 
including to the construction and real estate sectors 
where the NPL ratio declined from about 28% to 
26% last year. Although they were reduced only 
modestly, NPLs for household loans displayed the 
lowest ratio to total loans of about 5.5% at end 
2016. The average NPL ratio on the foreign 
operations of Spanish banks is below 5% on 
average, and thus much lower than for the 
domestic activity. According to data by the EBA 
for the first half of 2016(18), the aggregate NPL 
                                                          
(18) EBA (2016), Risk Assessment of the European Banking 
System, December.  
ratio (19) of Spanish banks was only slightly above 
the EU median.  
21. Banks further reduced forborne and 
foreclosed assets in 2016. Forborne loans 
continued declining, by around 32% y-o-y to 
EUR 147 billion at consolidated sector level. As in 
2015, sales of existing foreclosed assets 
(amounting nearly 15% of the stock of 
foreclosures at the end of 2015), exceeded 
additions of new foreclosures (around 12.3% of the 
stock).  
22. Restructuring of the banking sector has 
gone beyond state-aided banks.  The entire 
Spanish banking sector has since the crisis 
significantly adjusted its business model and 
lowered cost basis, especially by reducing the 
branch network and the number of staff by around 
one third each.    
                                                          
(19) The EBA (2016) study relies on the harmonised European 
definition of NPLs for supervisory purposes (under 
FINREP) at the highest level of consolidation. The 
denominator of the ratio only covers exposures qualifying 
as loans, thus excluding debt securities or off‐balance sheet 
exposures. Due to differences in scope and definition, the 
EBA figures tend to differ from the figures provided by 
BdE. 
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Graph 2.8: Non-performing loans 
 
(1) The scope of non-performing loans covered in these 
figures overlap with BdE's definition of doubtful loans. 
(2) Home loans comprise also loans that are not mortgages 
Source: BdE, own calculations. 
23. In 2016, profits of Spanish banks continued 
to be squeezed by very low interest rates, slow 
lending activity and further provisioning. 
Banks' net interest income declined by 8% from 
2015 to 2016, and operating income by 13%, or 
EUR 3.3 billion, as banks' operating costs 
remained nearly constant. As in 2015, the total 
provisions built by the banks remained at a similar 
and relatively high level of close to EUR 16 billion 
representing more than 70% of the banks' net 
operating income. This shows that the process of 
balance-sheet clean-up is rather lengthy and costly 
(see Graph 2.9). As a result, the profit before tax 
shrunk by about EUR 3 billion or 30% from 2015 
to 2016. During the last quarter of 2016, the 
aggregate financial results of Spanish banks on 
domestic operations were negative – but positive 
during the whole year -, due to the substantial 
impact of the provisions recorded by a mid-sized 
bank and following some changes to the bank 
accounting regime by BdE. Gross consolidated 
profits, including foreign operations, decreased by 
about 20% in 2016 to less than EUR 11 billion. 
A 4.3% return on equity was recorded which was 
somewhat higher than the EU average. Also in 
terms of cost-to-income ratio Spanish banks do 
relatively well compared to their EU peers. 
Graph 2.9: Bank sector profitability 
 
Source: BdE, own calculations. 
24. On average, Spanish banks further 
strengthened their capital positions in 2016. The 
average common equity tier 1 ratio rose by 16 bps 
to 12.8% as of December 2016. This is well above 
the regulatory and supervisory minima. The total 
solvency ratio also strengthened by a similar 
amount of basis points in annual terms. The main 
driver of the higher capital levels was the internal 
generation of capital through profits and the 
issuance of equity and non-core capital 
instruments, such as contingent capital or 
subordinated debt instruments that qualify as own 
funds. The reduction of credit portfolios has also 
contributed to the increase in capital ratios. 
Nevertheless, despite being on a declining trend, 
NPLs are still high and represent a burden. Some 
smaller banks still need to reinforce their balance 
sheets. 
25. On 7 June 2017, Banco Popular was 
resolved following difficulties linked to a 
significant portfolio of legacy real estate assets 
and rapidly deteriorating liquidity. Banco 
Popular emerged from the "adverse" scenario of 
the 2016 European Banking Authority (EBA) 
stress tests in a relatively weak position, prompting 
it to issue capital in the amount of EUR 2.5 billion 
at the end of June 2016. On 6 June 2017, the ECB 
decided that Banco Popular was "failing or likely 
to fail" due to a significant deterioration of its 
liquidity position therefore triggering action by the 
SRB. The SRB adopted a resolution scheme 
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entailing the sale of Banco Popular to Banco 
Santander for the price of EUR 1. The purpose of 
this operation was to ensure continuity of the 
bank's business activities, including full access by 
customers to deposits, and to avoid adverse effects 
on financial stability. The SRB decided to write-
down and convert all capital instruments of Banco 
Popular prior to the transfer of assets to Santander 
in order to address the shortfall in the value of the 
institution. Hence, the implemented resolution 
ensured full protection of deposit holders and 
avoided the use of tax payers' money. 
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3.1. PROGRESS WITH BANK RESTRUCTURING 
26. The implementation of the restructuring 
plans of state-aided banks is well advanced and 
should be completed by the end of the year. The 
burden-sharing exercises of banks have been 
completed. In terms of capacity, most of the banks 
have already reached their operational targets, 
while others continue reducing the number of 
branches and cutting their workforce. They also 
continue reducing their balance sheet size in line 
with their restructuring objectives. As regards the 
required divestments of subsidiaries, banks are 
mostly on track, although some specific sales are 
facing difficulties due to the complexities of 
selling real estate companies or selling/liquidating 
non-fully-owned subsidiaries. The monitoring of 
restructuring plans will continue until the end of 
the restructuring period. 
27. Banks continue adjusting their balance 
sheets and credit portfolios at a good pace in 
order to reach a balanced and sustainable 
business structure. Banks' liquidity and funding 
positions have been further strengthened. In 
particular, the loans-to-deposits (LTD) ratio and 
recourse to ECB funding are further receding for 
most of the entities. As far as solvency is 
concerned, all the restructured banks retained 
similar capital levels in 2016, compared to 2015. 
Those capital levels are comfortable, given that 
they have been increasing in previous years. 
28. Bank re-privatisation started in 2014 but 
has stalled since then. In 2014, the FROB sold its 
stakes in NCG Banco (now ABANCA) and 
Catalunya Banc to Banesco Group and BBVA 
respectively. It also started the re-privatisation of 
Bankia, by selling on the market 7.5% of the 
shares held in Bankia by BFA. Since then, no 
further privatisation of parts of Bankia has been 
carried out due to rather weak bank equity market 
conditions and political uncertainty. Earlier this 
year, FROB gave green light for the merger of 
state-owned Bankia and BMN with the intention of 
progressing with their privatisation. In the 
meantime, however, the deadline for the 
divestments of public stakes in Bankia and BMN 
has been extended by two years (to 2019) through 
a Royal Decree Law (RDL 4/2016) issued by the 
government at the end of last year. The 
government considers the two-year extension 
warranted to ensure the most efficient use of public 
funds.  
29. Bankia's legal contingencies regarding an 
initial public offering (IPO) in 2011 and the sale 
of hybrid instruments are contained. Following 
the adverse rulings by the Spanish Supreme Court 
on the existence of accounting errors for its 2011 
IPO, Bankia decided to compensate all retail 
investors that bought shares into it. Bankia and its 
holding company, BFA, agreed to share any losses 
from civil lawsuits or the voluntary compensations 
provided that the sharing does not result in further 
State aid. The full amount of the retail tranche of 
the IPO (EUR 1.84 billion) is already fully 
provisioned by BFA/Bankia. Similarly, Bankia has 
sufficient provisions for losses regarding hybrid 
instruments to retail investors, which may be 
increased if necessary. 
3.2. SAREB – RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND 
OUTLOOK 
30. SAREB's provisional results for 2016 show 
continued divestment of its portfolio but do not 
point to an improvement of its financial results. 
Since its inception, SAREB achieved a 21% 
reduction of its portfolio to EUR 39.7 billion and 
amortised EUR 9.8 billion of senior debt. An 
active conversion of loans into real-estate units 
(REOs) took place with the latter representing now 
33% of the portfolio from 22% originally. 
Notwithstanding the overall success of SAREB in 
contributing to the stabilisation of the Spanish 
banking sector over the past years, it continues to 
make sizeable losses despite the ongoing 
stabilisation of the real estate market. SAREB 
posted another pre-tax loss of EUR 663 million in 
2016. Following the change in accounting 
standards stipulated by Royal Decree Law 4/2016, 
which eliminated the impact of the asset 
impairments resulting from valuing SAREB's 
portfolio on the P&L account, the cumulated losses 
of the company over 2012-2016 were restated and 
reduced to EUR 750 million. In parallel, SAREB's 
capital buffers were restored to EUR 4 billion at 
end-2016 as the former asset impairments were 
recorded as reserves included in capital. At the 
same time, RDL 4/2016 maintained the 
transparency of mark-to-market SAREB's portfolio 
European Commission 
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introduced by the BdE Circular 5/2015. As a 
result, an adjustment to equity in amount of EUR 
3.4 billion was recorded at end-2016 in order to 
provision for mark-to-market losses. It is worth 
mentioning that SAREB's real estate assets (REO) 
portfolio displayed EUR 1.5 billion of potential 
gains that were not off-set against the losses of the 
loan portfolio according to the current valuation 
rules for SAREB's assets.  
31. SAREB's revenues in 2016 were at about 
the same level as in 2015, i.e. EUR 3.9 billion, 
but 24% lower than the peak revenues recorded 
in 2014. Nevertheless, the completion of the 
migration to four new servicers facilitated a higher 
number of divested assets in 2016, which increased 
by 25% over 2015. At the same time, SAREB 
increased the number of asset sales incurring 
capital losses in 2016, so that its gross margin 
amounted to only EUR 664 million or 46% lower 
y-o-y. This has heavily impacted the financial 
results for the year which ended with an almost 
equal pre-tax loss of EUR 663.  
32. Several factors contributed to the so far 
negative financial results of SAREB. The most 
important ones are the slower than expected 
recovery of real estate prices, an underestimation 
at SAREB's inception of the costs of carrying its 
portfolio, the difficulty to value accurately the 
transferred assets and the cost of interest rate 
hedging. The slower divestment of SAREB's 
portfolio in 2015 and 2016 relative to 2014 is due 
to two exceptional factors:  (1) the transfer to the 
new portfolio servicers (which was delayed, but is 
now completed) and (2) the gradual transformation 
of loans into real estate assets (REOs). This 
requires a laborious process of loan restructuring, 
debt-for-asset swaps and use of the judicial system 
to foreclose assets.  
33. The ongoing recovery of the Spanish real 
estate market may improve SAREB's financial 
situation. The key determinant of SAREB's 
financial results remains the evolution of the real 
estate market. From peak to bottom, average 
Spanish real estate prices declined by about 40%, 
but now they stabilised and started to grow slowly 
again. However, SAREB's portfolio is 
geographically skewed: about 75% is located in 
areas where the price recovery was slower due to 
previous over-building.  
3.3. PROGRESS WITH FINANCIAL SECTOR 
REFORMS 
34. The Spanish authorities approved the 
extension of the suspension of evictions for 
vulnerable families. The suspension of evictions, 
which entered into force in 2012, was initially 
designed as a temporary measure. On 17 March 
2017, the Government extended the suspension by 
three years (through Royal Decree-Law 5/2017). 
The prolongation was accompanied by a widening 
of the definition of vulnerable families.  
35. The BdE has updated its macro-prudential 
tools to the regulatory changes enshrined in 
Law 10/2014. Under the G-SII identification 
methodology by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) and the Capital Requirement 
Directive (CRDIV), transposed in Spain through 
Law 10/2014, Santander was identified among the 
Global Systemically Important Banks(20). 
Santander therefore needs to meet a buffer of 0.5% 
buffer in 2017, 0.75% in 2018 and a 1% from 2019 
onwards, conditional upon future annual reviews. 
Moreover, as regards the domestic systemic 
importance of the banking sector, the BdE 
established a capital buffer for the five largest 
Other Systemically Important Institutions (O-SIIs) 
(21), i.e. BBVA, Caixabank, Bankia, Sabadell and 
Popular(22), in October 2016, with a gradual 
phase-in period. In application of the EBA 
methodology on the identification of O-SIIs 
(EBA/GL/2014/10) and the criteria established by 
the ECB to reduce heterogeneity across banks 
supervised by of the SSM, BBVA is expected to 
meet a 0.75% buffer whereas the other four 
banking groups are expected to meet a 0.25% 
buffer from 1 January 2019 onwards. This decision 
was adopted before the resolution scheme for 
Popular was approved by the Commission and the 
SRB. Hence, a new path for the consolidated 
                                                          
(20) Based on (a) group size; (b) the interconnectedness of the 
group with the financial system; (c) the possibility of 
replacing the services or the financial infrastructure that the 
group provides; (d) the complexity of the group; and (e) the 
group’s cross-border activity 
(21) Apart from the largest bank, Santander, for which the 
highest of the two buffers (G-SIIs and O-SIIs) is applied, in 
accordance with CRDIV provisions. Since the two are 
identical, the buffer required for Santander in 2017 will be 
0.50%. 
(22) The six systemically important institutions in Spain 
account for around 81% of total assets of the consolidated 
banking sector. 
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Santander banking group (including Popular) may 
be approved in the near future. Finally, the BdE 
introduced the counter-cyclical buffer in December 
2015 to be applied from January 2016 onwards. 
However, given the subdued credit dynamics, BdE 
continued to set the quarterly buffer rate at 0% in 
March 2017.  
36. The lending activity of the Instituto de 
Credito Oficial (ICO) played an important 
counter-cyclical role during the crisis, but has 
recently slowed down significantly. As bank 
lending to SMEs picked up in the aftermath of the 
crisis, ICO's provision of new credit to the 
economy decreased significantly. New credits 
through the so-called second-floor facilities 
declined from a stock of about EUR 16 billion in 
2014 to around EUR 5 billion in 2016. At present, 
ICO is focusing on providing export facilities 
(internationalisation of the economy), boosting its 
AXIS subsidiary for venture capital, contributing 
to the Investment Plan for Europe, and promoting 
the development of securitisation of SME lending 
portfolios. Thus ICO is increasing its financial 
agent role, managing funds on behalf of others. 
ICO has enhanced the activity of "Axis" that 
manages several private equity funds that aim at 
promoting the venture capital industry in Spain, 
supporting the expansion of start-ups and mid-caps 
and financing infrastructure projects. The largest 
of these funds – the Fond-ICO Global – is a fund 
of funds. It has been granting funding to private 
funds that are selected through a recurrent public 
tendering process since 2013. An eighth tender has 
been launched in December 2016, bringing the 
total approved funds to 48, with financing 
commitments of up to EUR 1.1 billion.  
37. In addition to ICO's activity, other 
initiatives were pursued to strengthen non-bank 
financial intermediation. The Ministry of 
Finance's Compañía Española de Reafianzamiento 
(CERSA) vehicle, which acts as a guarantor of 
Spain's regional public guarantees offered to 
Spanish SMEs, has grown substantially in recent 
years. In February 2016, the European Investment 
Fund (EIF) entered into a new agreement to 
provide CERSA counter-guarantees, benefiting 
from support of the EFSI as part of the Investment 
Plan for Europe. The new agreement facilitated the 
leveraging of additional loans of about 
EUR 1.7 billion in 2016, more than doubling 
CERSA's guaranteed loan portfolio. The 
integration of CERSA funds by mergers advanced, 
and the mutual guarantee companies were 
consolidated from 23 to 18, thereby increasing the 
reliability of their services. Another initiative is the 
Spanish Mercado Alternativo de Renta Fija 
(MARF), which was founded in 2013 as an 
alternative market for SME fixed-income 
securities. MARF has grown significantly in 2016; 
the total outstanding balances of its listed 
instruments almost doubled to about EUR 2 billion 
at end-2016. In October 2016, Title I of the Law 
5/2015 regarding the SME Financial Information 
report to be provided by banks and the Circular of 
Bank of Spain that develops it entered into force. 
Thus, banks must notify SMEs three months in 
advance of their intention to terminate a certain 
financing agreement and provide SMEs with their 
financial and credit risk information track record. 
38. A Royal Decree recently adopted by the 
government delays the full implementation of 
the savings banks' reform. The reform of the 
saving banks' sector is one of the key pillars of the 
financial assistance programme. Its rationale is to 
set incentives to reduce controlling stakes of 
banking foundations in banks by imposing 
additional costs on them. The last legal step of the 
reform - BdE Circular 6/2015 approved in 
November 2015 - establishes additional 
obligations for banking foundations that hold a 
controlling stake in a bank. The Royal Decree 
536/2017 adopted by the government on 26 May 
2017 weakens some of these obligations. It reduces 
the proportion of cash dividends received by the 
banking foundations that have to be allocated to 
the reserve fund, from 50% to 30%.  It also 
extends the time period for generating reserve 
funds, from the initial five (plus two additional 
years where justified) to eight years (plus one 
additional year). These amendments reduce the 
incentives for banking foundations to divest 
controlling stakes in former saving banks. 
39. The resolution action taken with respect to 
Banco Popular is the first adopted by the SRB 
and signals that the EU resolution framework 
created in the aftermath of the last financial 
crisis works properly. Progress continues as 
regards the participation of Spain in the SRB. 
Under the framework of the internal resolution 
teams for the banking groups, the Spanish 
authorities continued to draft resolution plans to be 
endorsed by the SRB. BdE is making progress in 
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discussing with the banks the concrete content of 
the required resolution plans as well as identifying 
the main challenges ahead. The resolution decision 
of Banco Popular allowed to ensure the continuity 
of the important functions performed by the bank 
and to avoid significant adverse effects on 
financial stability. The sale was subject to normal 
merger and regulatory review and losses were fully 
absorbed by shares and subordinated debt and did 
not entail any State aid nor aid from the Single 
Resolution Fund. 
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40. Like in the case of their European peers, 
profitability remains squeezed for the Spanish 
banks. The main contributors appear to be the low 
interest rate environment, combined with declining 
volumes of business, an increase in legal costs and 
the still high although declining level of NPLs. In 
addition, banks are vulnerable to a potential 
correction in the price of financial assets 
associated with a downward revision of growth 
expectations and the increase of long term interest 
rates. Furthermore, as banks intensify competition 
for new business, credit standards may be 
weakened, resulting in the possible mispricing of 
risk on some credit portfolios. Such temptations 
which resemble some of the pre-crisis loan 
origination practices should be avoided.  
41.  While on average NPLs have continued to 
decline, the burden of legacy real estate assets 
remains high in some banks. The downward 
trend in the NPL ratio has continued for the 
aggregate banking sector. However, dispersion 
between banking groups and institutions is 
significant. In this regard, and given the sluggish 
recovery on net interest margins, profitability in 
some banks is suffering additional pressure.  
42. Recent court rulings add to the pressure on 
the banks' already challenged profitability.  The 
European Court of Justice ruled on the Spanish 
mortgage floor clauses. As a result, banks will 
have to pay back substantial amounts to consumers 
who had variable-interest mortgages with floor 
clauses. Since there are still legal steps to be taken 
before the payments become effective, and the fact 
that they will be extended over time may mitigate 
their impact on banks' balance sheets. Although 
the affected banks had built up provisions for 
litigation risks, which have already impacted their 
profitability, the cost of consumers' compensation 
needs to be closely monitored. In response, the 
government recently approved the creation of a 
monitoring commission. 
43. Bank reprivatisation is proceeding slowly. 
The Spanish authorities are expected to make 
progress with the divestment of public stakes in 
Bankia and BMN. The Commission continues 
monitoring the implementation of both Bankia’s 
and BMN’s restructuring plans, even though the 
deadline for the divestment of FROB from these 
two banks has been extended from 2017 to 2019.  
More recently, a Royal Decree recently adopted by 
the government delays the implementation of the 
savings banks' reform, by reducing the incentives 
for banking foundations to divest controlling 
stakes in former saving banks. 
44. The effective implementation of Banco 
Popular's transfer to Banco Santander needs to 
be closely monitored.   Supervisory authorities 
will have to monitor the effective implementation 
of the acquisition of Popular by Santander and 
closely follow any risk derived from potential 
litigation costs. 
45. SAREB faces serious challenges to finalise 
the divestment of its portfolio in a profitable 
manner. SAREB made further progress to 
optimise its operations which culminated with the 
finalisation of migrating the asset portfolio to the 
new servicers. Nevertheless, it still has to better 
adapt its IT infrastructure to its business model, 
strengthen internal control systems and attract new 
talent as staff. Most importantly, SAREB needs to 
monitor very well its servicers and develop 
innovative selling channels that would allow it to 
mitigate the slower than expected recovery of real-
estate prices. Finally, operational costs, and in 
particular the costs of managing, marketing and 
maintaining its gradually increasing portfolio of 
real estate assets, will have to be well managed. 
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Table A.1: Main macroeconomic and financial indicators 
 
(f)  2017: forecast or latest available data 
(g)  General government balances include capital transfers related to support of banks 
(h)  ESA2010 and BPM6 
(i) NPLs: ratios, in % of total loans 
Source: Ameco, BdE, Eurostat, IHS Markit 
 
1995
-1999
2000
-2004
2005
-2008
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
(f) 
Core indicators
GDP growth rate 3.6 3.7 3.2 - 3.6 0.0 - 1.0 - 2.9 - 1.7 1.4 3.2 3.2 2.8
  of which domestic demand incl. stocks 4.1 4.3 3.7 - 6.4 - 0.5 - 3.1 - 5.1 - 3.2 1.9 3.3 2.8 2.3
Private consumption (annual % change) 3.3 3.5 2.6 - 3.6 0.3 - 2.4 - 3.5 - 3.1 1.6 2.9 3.2 2.5
Public consumption (annual % change) 2.7 4.7 5.7 4.1 1.5 - 0.3 - 4.7 - 2.1 - 0.3 2.0 0.8 0.9
HICP (annual % change) 2.8 3.2 3.5 - 0.2 2.0 3.0 2.4 1.5 - 0.2 - 0.6 - 0.3 2.0
Unemployment rate (% of labour force) 17.8 11.3 9.3 17.9 19.9 21.4 24.8 26.1 24.5 22.1 19.6 17.6
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 22.9 27.0 30.3 24.3 23.0 21.5 19.8 18.8 19.1 19.7 19.9 20.2
Gross national saving (% of GDP) 21.9 23.0 21.7 20.3 19.7 18.6 19.5 20.2 20.4 21.4 22.3 22.3
General Government (% of GDP)
Balance (g) - 4.1 - 0.5 0.2 - 11.0 - 9.4 - 9.6 - 10.5 - 7.0 - 6.0 - 5.1 - 4.5 - 3.2 
Gross debt 63.0 51.3 39.1 52.8 60.1 69.5 85.7 95.5 100.4 99.8 99.4 99.2
Interest expenditure 4.4 2.6 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.5 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.6
Households
Households saving rate 12.8 10.8 7.8 13.4 10.1 10.8 8.6 9.6 9.0 8.2 7.7 7.2
Rest of the world (% of GDP)
Trade balance - 0.7 - 2.7 - 5.5 - 1.2 - 1.3 - 0.2 1.5 3.3 2.4 2.4 2.9 2.7
Trade balance, goods - 3.6 - 5.8 - 8.2 - 3.8 - 4.4 - 4.2 - 2.8 - 1.4 - 2.2 - 2.0 - 1.6 - 1.9 
Trade balance, services 2.9 3.1 2.7 2.7 3.1 3.9 4.3 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.7
Current account balance - 1.4 - 4.3 - 8.9 - 4.3 - 3.9 - 3.3 - 0.4 1.5 1.0 1.3 1.9 1.6
Net financial assets - 27.7 - 42.0 - 70.2 - 90.2 - 85.4 - 90.2 - 91.8 - 92.1 - 95.2 - 90.4 - 85.2 n.a.
Net international investment position (h) - 28.8 - 44.3 - 71.6 - 93.5 - 88.6 - 91.9 - 89.9 - 94.3 - 97.5 - 91.3 - 85.7 n.a.
Competitiveness (index, 2005=100)
Real effective exchange rate relative to the 
rest of the euro area
87.3 91.7 100.3 101.1 100.0 98.4 93.9 92.3 91.5 91.7 90.5 89.8
Real effective exchange rate relative to the 
rest of the European Union
88.6 90.1 98.4 102.3 100.0 98.5 93.5 92.5 91.4 90.4 90.3 90.0
Real effective exchange rate relative to the 
rest of 37 industrialised countries
87.4 88.1 99.7 104.1 100.0 98.6 92.5 93.1 92.4 89.2 88.6 87.7
Banking sector
Assets (% of GDP) 170.8 189.9 267.9 319.4 321.1 338.3 344.4 307.3 286.7 263.0 244.9 232.2
Private domestic credit (y-o-y %) 11.8 14.7 18.9 - 1.6 0.8 - 3.2 - 9.9 - 10.2 - 6.5 - 4.2 - 4.1 - 2.3 
Non-performing loans (NPLs), total (%) (i) 3.3 1.1 1.5 5.1 5.8 7.8 10.4 13.6 12.5 10.1 9.1 8.8
NPLs, productive activities (%) n.a. 1.2 1.5 6.2 7.9 11.3 15.5 20.3 18.5 14.6 13.1 n.a.
 " of which, construction, and (%) n.a. 1.0 1.7 8.5 12.1 18.2 25.8 34.3 32.6 30.0 29.1 n.a.
 " real estate activities (%) n.a. 0.6 1.8 10.1 14.0 21.4 29.1 38.0 36.2 27.5 25.5 n.a.
NPLs, residential mortgages (%) n.a. 0.4 1.0 2.9 2.6 3.1 4.4 6.6 6.2 5.1 5.1 n.a.
Tier 1 ratio (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. 9.3 9.6 10.2 9.7 11.7 11.7 12.6 13.1 n.a.
Interest rates
10 year spread vis-à-vis the Bund (%) 1.6 0.2 0.1 0.8 1.5 2.8 4.3 3.0 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.5
CDS 5 year (basis points) n.a. n.a. 14.6 92.0 204.0 319.6 431.9 235.4 90.5 84.1 82.1 61.7
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